Contrary to what may initially appear, the body of medical knowledge and therapeutic practices promoted by Jamshid Khodadadi under the titles of "Traditional Medicine" and "Quranic Medicine" raises a number of serious ethical, methodological, and legal concerns. This article critically examines Khodadadi's medical discourse through the lenses of medical ethics, philosophy of science, and Iranian medical law. It argues that several aspects of his approach—including the practice of medicine without formal professional qualifications, the premature generalization of therapeutic claims based on personal experience, the absence of scientifically validated research protocols, the extension of medical judgments across diverse specialized fields without requisite expertise, the exploitation of vulnerable patients, and the problematic invocation of the term "Quranic Medicine"—constitute significant grounds for ethical and legal scrutiny.
The present study does not seek to evaluate the empirical efficacy of traditional medicine as such, nor does it deny the potential value of certain traditional therapeutic practices. Rather, its principal concern is methodological legitimacy and ethical accountability. From the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science, the validity of scientific claims depends not merely upon their possible truth but, more fundamentally, upon the reliability and legitimacy of the methods through which such claims are established. Accordingly, this article demonstrates that Khodadadi's methodological framework suffers from substantial inconsistencies and that his therapeutic discourse conflicts with several established principles of medical ethics, including non-maleficence, professional competence, informed consent, and research ethics.
Furthermore, the article argues that the designation "Quranic Medicine," despite its apparent rhetorical and cultural appeal, is problematic not only from a methodological standpoint but also from theological and epistemological perspectives. The conflation of religious authority with empirical therapeutic claims risks undermining both scientific integrity and religious credibility. In this regard, the ethical and legal critique developed in this article may contribute to the emergence of a relatively neglected but culturally significant field within medical ethics and medical jurisprudence in contemporary Iran.